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Muslim women leaders in the Ferghana Valley: Whose leadership is it anyway?
By Svetlana Peshkova 1
Abstract
There are many geographic and historical examples of Muslim women leaders,
yet questions about women’s ability to lead and the kinds of leadership women can
assume are still a part of scholarly and public debates among Muslims. In this article,
based on two years of ethnographic fieldwork in the Ferghana Valley (Uzbekistan), I
provide examples of Muslim women’s leadership and argue that in order to fully
understand women’s leadership we need to question the assumption that men and women
desire the same forms of leadership. A desire for leadership is not intrinsic to women (or
humans in general) but is socio-historically specific. Approaching critically some existing
assumptions about women’s leadership, I identify and provide examples of different,
equally important, forms of leadership that a specific socio-historical context has
engendered.
Keywords: Women’s leadership, Islam, Uzbekistan
People’s Professor
Feruza-opa2 was described by some of her students as “the one who brings
Islamic knowledge and spiritual peace into the hearts of the believers.” Her other
students called her a “people’s professor.” She called herself an otincha, a religious
teacher. As she said, she “taught Islam” to some local women and occasionally children;
some local men came by periodically to get her advice. At a meeting in 2002 in the
Ferghana Valley, I asked Feruza-opa about Hizb-ut-Tahrir (the Party of Liberation), a
transnational Islamist movement with the aim of establishing an Islamic State, which has
became a prominent actor in regional political discourse in the first decade of the twenty
first century. She replied, “they [the Hizb] think they have authority to go against the
existing authority. I think that they will not do anything, just aggravate. Muhammad said
‘do not go against the authority: good or bad, it is all from Allah. Do not go against the
Time [history]: it is still God’s creation.’ All their parties…it is a waste of time. Many of
them, men and women are in prison.” Feruza-opa did not support a vision such as Hizbut-Tahrir’s of the Valley (or Uzbekistan) as an Islamic state. Her emphasis, in her words,
was on “Muslim” and “Islamic” living, which according to Feruza-opa, heavily depended
on one’s religious education and ritual prayer: “When you pray – keep the line with what
Allah wants. ‘Five times a day remember Me’ [referring to Allah]… Namoz (ritual
prayer) keeps you from [doing] different bad things. If you read namoz Allah will give
you [grant your wishes].” Feruza-opa saw corporal and intellectual learning about
1
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“Islamic living” as the only viable way of changing individuals, the local community and
Uzbek society at large; as the only way of “not wasting time” and not being imprisoned.
Feruza-opa believed in and stressed the transformative value of education: Our people are
ovam hulq [uneducated people]. One needs to change people slowly. Otinchalar should
also do it slowly, not fast. I believe that people should read the Qur’an more. Those who
read will change themselves…We are yet to learn our religion. My mahallah
[neighborhood], my students - they do not do and do not allow others to do gnoh
[bad/evil deeds] because they know Islam. Mullahs [male religious leaders] also should
not read for themselves; they should read for and with the people…. One needs to share
what God gives you. If it is illim [knowledge, Ar. ‘ilm] you should share it too. What we
can and must do is to tell people about Islam, to share knowledge, to educate each other
and ovam hulq slowly.
For Feruza-opa and women like her, individual and societal transformation
through religious education was a slow moral process beginning with the sharing of
(religious) knowledge. Through this sharing at religious ceremonies or during religious
lessons, women like Feruza-opa,3 who were educated at the Soviet secular schools and
had different levels of religious education acquired through family members, homeschools and/or self-education, actively engaged in religious renewal in the Valley. They
led others towards an ethical ideal of a moral community that knows the difference
between evil and good deeds – that “knows Islam.”
Can Muslim women be leaders?
There is an ongoing debate among Muslims about women in leadership positions
(cf. Stowasser, 2001): Can women be leaders? And, if so, what kind of leadership can
they assume: religious (spiritual), political, both, or none? Muslim women, such as
women leaders in the Ferghana Valley, continue to act as leaders without necessarily
being recognized as such by formal religious and secular authorities. These women’s
informal leadership is an example of an Islamization from below, from within local
communities, as a moral individual and communal transformation. In this article I
demonstrate that a distinction between formal and informal forms of religious
leadership—the former associated with public domains and the latter with private
domains—is not natural. Rather it is a result of certain historical developments
characterizing a process of secularization and of religious renewal in the region. I show
how women’s religious leadership informs local social transformation. Finally, I address
the relevance of my research to the debate about Muslim women’s leadership.
Writing the place and the researcher
My ethnographic research (2001-2003) about post-Soviet religious renewal took
place in the Ferghana Valley, a densely populated agricultural area (about six million
people) with a few industrial cities shared among Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan.4 The Valley is variously described by some as a hub of Islamic radicalism
(e.g. Rashid, 2000; Rotar, 2006) and by others as the heart of Central Asian religious
practices, arts, sciences, and spirituality (e.g. Egger, 2008; Khalid, 2007). Although it is
tempting to talk about the region as Uzbek and Muslim, not every inhabitant of the
3
4

She graduated from a Pedagogical Institute with a degree in Farsi.
My research was conducted in the part of the Ferghana Valley that belongs to Uzbekistan.

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 11 #1 November 2009

https://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol11/iss1/2

6

2

Peshkova: Muslim women leaders in the Ferghana Valley

Valley is Uzbek, not every Uzbek is a pious Muslim, and not every pious Muslim is
Uzbek. Society and religion “do not coincide” (Makris, 2007:7). There are other ethnic
groups in the region, including Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Koreans, Russians, Roma and Jews, who
variously profess Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and atheism. Among Muslims, being
Muslim is expressed in a variety of ways. Some are devout. Others are cultural Muslims
whose religious observance is limited to certain religious holidays. There are born-again
Muslims who have transitioned from being cultural to being devout in post-Soviet
Uzbekistan.5 There are also Muslim atheists who claim to not believe in God but who
identify as Muslim because they were raised in Muslim households. In this article I focus
on devout and born-again Muslims, Uzbek and others.
Researching about born-again and devout Muslims in post-Soviet Central Asia, I
travelled widely in the Valley and met Muslim women religious practitioners, teachers,
and leaders (otinchalar) (cf. Fathi, 2006; Kamp, 2006). Their importance in local
communities was highlighted by the interviewees on several occasions. I identified thirty
otinchalar and focused on five of these and their students. These women, who were in
their 40s-60s6, had been educated in the secular state schools and a couple had the
equivalent of a bachelor’s or master’s degree (cf. Tolmacheva, 1993). They also had
different levels of religious education acquired through family members, home-schools
and/or self-education. They operated mainly in the private domain of individual homes
and had full access to women and children and occasionally to men.7
These women generously included me in their social circles. I was able to attend
religious classes and ceremonies. I observed, participated in (sometime by just being
there), and asked questions, while being questioned and observed by the otinchalar and
others about my life and research interests. My academic degrees in religion and
filmmaking, my Russian citizenship, my growing up in the Caucasus and my education in
the United States might have facilitated my acceptance into these women’s social circles,
within which I was grateful for being treated as a student and was taught about these
women’s lives and their understandings of the teachings of Islam. However fragmented
this process of learning might have been, it gives me some foundation to talk about these
Muslim women’s leadership.
Writing women’s lives as leaders
Soviet ethnographers frequently categorized Muslim women in Central Asia as
“the preservers of survivals,” “the bearers of a special ‘female religion’” and as
representatives of “a certain cultural lag. . . and deficiencies in cultural-enlightenment
work. . .” (Snesarev, 1974:226). Several scholars writing about post-Soviet Central Asia
have criticized such essentialized assessments as being driven by ideological incentives
and political expediency and argued that such accounts ignore the women’s differing
histories, social and class contexts and levels of religiosity (e.g. Kamp, 2006; Keller,
2001; Northrop, 2004). Despite recognizing a tapestry of women’s religious lives as a
critically important element of social transformation in the region, the binary of
“tradition” vs. “modernity” is still used by some scholars to explain complexities and
5

Uzbekistan achieved independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.
Younger otinchalar, in their 20s-30s, reported difficulty combining their religious leadership and family
responsibilities.
7
I do not speak about all the women in the region that self-identify as otinchalar.
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contradictions in women’s lives in general and their religiosity in particular (e.g. Akiner,
1997; Alimova & Azimova, 2000). Following Mahmood (2005), I argue that an
understanding of these women’s religiosity should not be reduced to such a priori
categories but should be critically analyzed as emerging from a particular socio-historical
context that enables certain understandings of relationships among individuals, the state,
the self and the Divine (2005:34).
Women leaders are an important subject in academic writing about Muslim
women’s lives in Indonesia, Iran, the Philippines, China, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Afghanistan
and other areas (e.g. Hoodfar, 2001; Horvatich, 1994; Jaschok & Jingjun, 2000;
Mahmood, 2005; Privratsky, 2004; Shalinsky, 1996; von Doorn-Harder, 2006). In studies
of post-Soviet Central Asia, Muslim women leaders are variously described as female
clerics/mullahs8 (Fathi, 1997; Kramer, 2002); a distinctive age-group of elder women
who act as guardians of tradition and “preach the faith” (Alimova & Azimova, 2000;
Corcoran-Nantes, 2005:139; Imamkhodjaeva, 2005; Tolmacheva, 1993); teachers
(Constantine, 2007; Kamp, 2006; Kandiyoti & Azimova, 2004); experts in religion and
ritual (Tokhtakhodjaeva, 1996:27); Qur’anic reciters (Khalid, 2007; Sultanova, 2000);
and as mechanisms of conflict mediation within local families (Gorshunova, 2001).
Various terms are used to refer to these women, such as otin, otonoy, or otin-oy
(cf. Fathi, 2006; Khalid, 2007; Kramer, 2002). I utilize the term otinchalar, a plural form
of the word otincha, which is a term of self-reference used by the women with whom I
studied. The word otincha is often translated as “teacher,” yet in my experience its usage
and conceptual meaning exceed educational domain. Following Marranci (2008), I think
of otinchalar as women who feel to be Muslim, desire to be better Muslims, rationalize
and act on these feeling and desire in various ways, including but not limited to
facilitating religious ceremonies among local women by reciting and interpreting
religious texts, and teaching these women (and occasionally children but rarely men)
about Islam’s history, principles and sacred texts (cf. Fathi, 2006). Some of them perform
and teach hymns about justice and salvation, while others focus on healing. Through this
array of activities, discourses, and performances, they systematically modify their
environment and lead their communities towards moral transformation, as understood by
these women.
Are otinchalar female mullahs, clerics, or imams?
The word imam is often taken to mean a leader in both religious scholarship and
congregational prayer. To be an imam one has to have a set of minimal qualifications,
such as an ability to recite the Qur’an, sufficient knowledge about performing a ritual
prayer, and a reputation for reason and piety (Mattson, 2005:11). Some scholars refer to
otinchalar as female mullahs and clerics. These women and their communities, however,
do not use these labels, although otinchalar do perform functions among local women
similar to those an imam does among the men. In addition to the qualifications described
above, some otinchalar are familiar with Islamic doctrine, history, and Islam’s normative
system (Ar. al-Shari’ah) and become local religious leaders through promoting
educational and ritual practice and providing social advice articulated in religious terms.
Following Mattson (2005), I argue that to define or think of otinchalar as clerics, mullahs
8
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or imams is to assume that these leadership positions are standard, thus obscuring rather
than clarifying gendered dynamics of Islamic religious leadership. In order to understand
these dynamics we should critically interrogate socio-historical contexts that engender
different forms of leadership such as otinchalar’s and question the assumption that all
Muslim women everywhere aspire to have the same leadership positions as do the men.
Muslim women leaders: a her-story
There are many examples of Muslim women leaders in authoritative religious and
historical sources, such the hadith literature, the Prophet’s biographies (e.g. by
Muhammad Ibn Sa`d (d. 844-45)),9 and in contemporary academic biographies of these
leaders.10 Yet, Mattson (2005) suggests that the quest for clear Qur’anic guidelines for
gendered leadership and a clear distinction between political and religious (or spiritual)
leadership is fruitless: these are not to be found in the Qur’an. Rather, Qur’anic verses
give general guidelines regarding forms of leadership. For instance, these verses stress
regularity of ritual performance and the importance of consultation with one’s
community (Q 42:38); highlight leading one family’s and one’s life in righteousness (Q
25:74); and thus emphasize a critical importance of a code of individual and social ethics,
and warn against selfishness and evil (Q 4:49). Hence, Quran’ic verses do not provide a
clear set of standards for gendered leadership, nor do they clearly distinguish between the
two forms of leadership, religious (spiritual) and political. Rather, such Qur’anic verses
emphasize ritual performance and individual and communal ethics as important markers
of a leader.
The hadith literature, a more potent source used to debate women’s leadership,
provides both examples of women’s leadership and the stories (I will refer to one of these
later in the article) used to limit women’s leadership. The Prophet and his family play
critically important roles in the historical and contemporary global, local, physical and
online debates about women’s leadership. Many Muslims regard the members of the
Prophet’s family as behavioral models worth imitating. The hadith literature provides the
early models of feminine behavior, ranging from sincere support to rebellion to
leadership. The Prophets’ wives Khadijah and Aisha, his daughter Fatima, and
granddaughter Zaynab are the earliest examples of Muslim women leaders (see Abbott,
1942; Ahmad, 2006; Mernissi, 1996; Wadud, 1999).
The fourteen hundred years of history of Muslim communities is both a his-story
and a her-story. Although putatively universal histories often turn out to be histories of
the masculine (his-stories) (Irigaray, 1974:165), contemporary scholars of Islam have
successfully highlighted the stories of the feminine (her-stories). Beginning with Hagar,
the mother of Ish’mail, the one divinely appointed to bear forth “the Arab and later
Muslim civilization,” we encounter a multitude of women leaders (Abugideiri, 2001:81).
Their patience and perseverance assured expansion of Islamic principles and genealogical
and cultural continuity and contiguity of his- and her-stories in the histories of Muslims
in various parts of the world.
9

The hadith literature (pl. Ar. ahadith) is a compilation of reports of the Prophet’s paradigmatic acts and
utterances, which constitutes the secondary body of religious authoritative texts.
10
Among these women are: Umm Ayman, Umm Kulthum bt. `Aqaba, Umayya bt. Qays, Umm Sinan,
Umm `Umara. The review of the literature that follows is by no means exhaustive but includes references
to other important Muslim women leaders.

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 11 #1 November 2009

Published by Virtual Commons - Bridgewater State University, 2009

9

5

Journal of International Women's Studies, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 2

A long history of religious leadership among Muslims includes various women
Sufi masters (e.g. As-Sulami, 1999) and Muslim women scholars of hadith (e.g. Siddiqi,
1993). Muslim women leaders are mentioned in several bibliographical accounts about
the Prophet’s women companions (Ar. sahabiyyat). Among these is Umm Waraqa bt.
`Abd Allah b. al-Harith, who was instructed by the Prophet to continue leading members
of her household (both men and women) in prayer at her home (Afsaruddin, 2002).
Muslim women’s leadership assured steady incremental changes in both practice
and theological developments from medieval to contemporary Islamic thought. AlSakhawi, a 15th century scholar, in his bibliographical work Kitab al-Nisa (the Book of
[about] Women), describes a large number of women religious scholars, refers to them as
kathirat al-riyasa (having plentitude of leadership), and notes that they became spiritual
and educational leaders for him and other male scholars (Afsaruddin, 2007). Nadwi
(2007) also provides biographies of various women teachers and scholars who wielded
considerable public authority in their societies; these were not exceptional cases.
Some Muslim women leaders, such as Rabyah al-Basri (e.g. Schimmel, 1975) or
Zaynab al-Gazali (e.g. al-Ghazali, 1989), avoided public spaces (thought of as “male
spaces”) by both literary and figuratively veiling themselves with special veils. Others,
such as Bahithat al-Badiyah, aggressively injected themselves in these spaces to
challenge the status quo of local mosques as male spaces (al-Jabri, 1976:16; Badran,
1995: 54-55). Pious Shi’a women in Lebanon and an Egyptian women’s mosque
movement are other examples of Muslim women’s leadership in various Islamic and
Islamists movements (e.g. Deeb, 2006; Mahmood, 2005; von Doorn-Harder, 2006).
The most widely publicized historical examples of Muslim women’s leadership
are Razia al-Din, a 13th century ruler of India (Zakaria, 2000); Nana Asma’u, a 19th
century revivalist in the West Africa (Mack & Boyd, 2000); and the 16th -17th centuries’
“sultanate of women” in the Ottoman Empire (e.g. Peirce, 1993). The 20th-21st centuries
present multiple examples of Muslim women leaders such as Huda Shaarawi, an
Egyptian leader in the struggle against colonialism (Shaarawi, 1987). Riffat Hassan,
Amina Wadud, Asma Barlas, Leila Ahmed, Fatima Mernissi, Amira Sonbol, Sharifa
Alkhateeb, Hadia Mubarak, Ingrid Mattson, Heba Raouf Ezzat, are among well-known
current Muslim scholars and activists.11
Finally, several ethnographies recognize, describe and analyze the everyday lives
of Muslim women leaders whose names are largely pseudonyms, such as Turkish hojas
(or hocas) (Saktanber, 2002); Philippine pandai (Horvatich, 1994); Syrian Qubaysis
(ethnographic research is yet to be done but see Hamidi, 2006; Kalmbach, 2008:39);
female Syrian teachers (Kalmbach, 2008); Iranian “female mullahs”(Hoodfar, 2001);
Bosnian bula (Bringa, 1995); Chinese ahong (Gillette, 2000; Jaschok & Jingjun, 2000),
Indonesian activists, preachers, and leaders (von Doorn-Harder, 2006), and women
leaders and preachers in Pakistan (Hegland, 1997; Nasr, 1994), Egypt (Mahmood, 2005)
and Nigeria (Sule & Starraff, 1991). In short, there is no shortage of Muslim women
leaders throughout the historical and geographical landscape of Muslim communities.
Otinchalar in the Ferghana Valley are among them.
The State, Islam, and gender
11

Some Muslim women are acting and former heads of state, such as the late Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan,
Tansu Penbe Çiller of Turkey, and Khaleda Zia and Sheik Hasina Wazed of Bangladesh.
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To understand the importance of otinchalar and their forms of leadership in
Uzbekistan, I would like to present a précis of historically rather problematic
relationships between Islam and the state in the 20th century (for a detailed historical
analysis see Keller, 2001; Khalid, 2007; Northrop, 2004). Following Marranci (2008), I
take Islam to be a map of discourses on how to feel and act as Muslim. Following
Foucault (1978), I take the state to mean an aggregation of various administrative and law
enforcement institutions, constituted by individuals whose individuality is submitted to a
set of patterns. This aggregation has an authority to make rules that govern people living
within a particular territory and its “techniques of power [are] present at every level of
the social body and utilized by very diverse [social] institutions …”(Foucault, 1978: 141).
From its inception, the Soviet state was envisioned as a secular union of republics.
In order to imprint this vision of the state onto its diverse subjects in Central Asia, the
Bolsheviks (later known as the Communists) sponsored a socio-political campaign
against overtly expressing one’s religious identity. Defined by the organizers as a
normative Islamic practice, veiling became a focus of this campaign. Assault on legal
religious institutions, such as Shariat courts,12 and the waqf property (religious land
endowment) were other foci of this campaign (Haghayeghi, 1996). The organizers
positioned gender as a center of radical social change (Northrop 2004), while
essentialized Islam was defined as an oppressive socio-politically system that molded its
subjects through restrictive practices such as veiling (cf. Geertz, 1968; e.g. Northrop,
2004). According to this model, if Islam was uprooted through unveiling13 and other
means, the Soviet state as a secular union would have an uncontested ability to exercise
power over its Central Asian subjects. During this campaign many mosques were closed
and some clergy were arrested, exiled, or executed. Some religious activities became
formalized under state political control and required registration and state-run economic
management. Other religious activities became informal as they took place mainly in
domestic space. These activities and leaders, such as otinchalar, could not be effectively
persecuted or controlled by the state and became respected conduits of religious
knowledge and practice for the local population.
Scholarly assessments vary regarding these attempts at producing a Soviet state as
a secular union and at transforming gender roles (Kamp, 2006; Tokhtakhodjaeva, 1995).
But there were two important outcomes of this campaign. First, some religious activities
became formalized under state political control and required registration and state-run
economic management. Other religious activities became informal as they took place
mainly in domestic space. These activities and leaders, such as otinchalar, could not be
effectively persecuted or controlled by the state and became respected conduits of
religious knowledge and practice for the local population.
The second outcome was adoption and definition of certain expressions of
religiosity as “national traditions” by the Communist Party in 1930s while realizing that
excessive use of force only alienated local populations (Keller, 2001). By the end of
Shariat (Ar. al-Shari’ah) is “a normative system of Islam as historically understood and developed by
Muslim jurists… [which] includes a much broader set of principles and norms than legal subject matter as
such” (An-Na’im, Abdullahi Ahmed. 2002 Islamic Family Law in a Changing World. London: Zed Books.
p. 1).
13
Kamp (2006) argues that unveiling was underway among some women before the Bolsheviks’ campaign
(p.133).
12
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the1930s, the Communist Party realized its inability to uproot Islam completely and
adopted definitions of certain expressions of religiosity as “national traditions”
maintained by discourses such as “differences in gender roles,” importance of sexual
honor and family values, and “views of marriage … [as] companionship more than
equality” (Kamp, 2006:230). Reflecting some of these discourses about family values and
differences in gender roles, men were expected “to go out and engage in the rough and
tumble of the world, whereas women were to guard the chastity of the home and of the
community” (Khalid, 2007:103). Women’s participation in Soviet social life was not
limited, yet centered heavily on “inner values of the community” that were nurtured
through social gatherings and religious ceremonies taking place in domestic space (and at
sacred sites), thus giving them [women] a central place in religious leadership (e.g.
Kandiyoti & Azimova, 2004; Khalid, 2007:103).
The independence of Uzbekistan from the Soviet Union in 1991 stirred a new
hope of religious freedom and a growing support from the Uzbek state of Islam as a
symbol of national identity. New mosques were built. Some religious schools were reopened, and some clergy—overwhelmingly male— were trained in Turkey (Khalid,
2007:118-120). Religious education for many men and for some women was offered at
various outlets in both informal (e.g. home-schools) and formal (e.g. Islamic University
in Tashkent and schools of higher Islamic education (madrasas)) domains (cf. Fathi,
2006; Rasanayagam, 2006).
Soon after independence, in the context of a great economic decline, exCommunist elites consolidating their power and fearing religious and political opposition
pursued a course of taking control of Islam and persecuting many religious leaders, both
formal and informal and both men and women (e.g. McGlinchey, 2007). The informal
leaders operating in the private domain of people’s homes were less accessible to the
state and therefore suffered less persecution (Fathi, 2006:313).
Thus, a distinction between formal and informal forms of religious leadership (the
former associated with public domains and the latter with private domains) was a result
of certain historical developments characterizing a process of secularization and of
religious renewal in the region. This distinction continued to inform expressions of public
religiosity. Although all religious leaders -- formal and informal -- were respected by the
local people, at the time of research otinchalar were among informal religious leaders
seen by the local people as independent from the discredited political regime, who
continued to lead local Muslims through religious education, ritual practice, advice, and
persuasion, towards moral transformation in spite of growing state control.
Leading how?
Otinchalar lead local communities in three areas: teaching, religious practice and
socio-religious advice. Otinchalar with a higher level of religious knowledge teach
women at their home-schools. The acquired religious knowledge allows some of these
women to critically assess their religious rights and their social context. This critical
assessment does not manifest itself in production of either clearly gendered or feminist
(broadly defined) discourses. It does help local women to evaluate their social
environment in light of religious knowledge as a first step towards changing this
environment, if they chose to do so.
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During one class Feruza-opa began a discussion of polygyny (a social practice when
a male has multiple female spouses) by reciting the verse from the Qur’an (Q 4:3) that
some interpret to sanction polygyny.14 Polygyny was a highly contested issue in the
Ferghana Valley. In an interview Aylar, one of the students, stressed that since
Uzbekistan’s independence it became a common practice for some men (often financially
secure) to have mistresses: “They can have three or four mistresses and it is not
considered to be a problem. One of these mistresses may become an illegal wife [in
secular terms].” Aylar also mentioned that people’s evaluation of such marriages varied
from condemnation to acceptance. In some cases, according to her, “the wives could even
come and visit with each other.”
In response to the recited verse and its interpretation by Feruza-opa, who emphasized
equal treatment of the wives as a necessary prerequisite of a polygynous marriage, two
students expressed their disapproval of polygyny. Another student highlighted its
situational usefulness as in a case of the first wife’s sickness, when, according to this
student a husband could take a second wife to help raise the kids and care for the sick
wife. Another student talked about the economic security that a polygynous marriage,
although emotionally draining, can offer some women in Uzbekistan.
Reminding the students about the cultural and historical context of this social
practice by locating the verse in the “old times Arabston [referring to what now is Saudi
Arabia and surrounding countries],” Feruza-opa stressed that “Islam set a limit to four,”
and posited a question to her students whether one could deal justly with four wives. The
students differed in their answers. Normative morality, however Divine in origin it might
have been, was understood by the students over against their social environment, thus
allowing these women to form their understanding and their moral assessment of
polygyny. For some this understanding was the first step towards accepting polygyny,
while for others it was the first step towards challenging it as unjust.
During another class in Feruza-opa’s home-school, the teacher and the students
discussed the issue of mahr15 and marriage contracts, which Feruza-opa defined as a
normative Islamic practice. A couple of students stated that they have not heard of any
marriage contracts in the Valley. Another student replied:A marriage contract would be a
good thing if it were to provide a woman with enough money to support her and her
children after divorce or if something happened to her husband. Local mullahs are against
it. They say 10-30,000 sums [about 10-30 dollars at the time] is sufficient, depending on
whether a female is a virgin. It is less if she is not a virgin. It is not right (participantobservation 2003).
By assessing local practices of mahr and noting a lack of marriage contracts in light of
their religious knowledge, the students and the teacher eventually concluded that local
practices supported by formal religious leadership were “not right.”
Fatima-hon, also an otincha, insisted on using the Qur'an as the foundation of her
teaching rather than accepting the opinions of others, such as formal religious leaders, as
normative: Some say “My relatives did this…. My dad was a mullah, he did that…” I
14

This verse can be understood as follows (from Yusuf Ali’s (1938) English translation): “Marry women of
your choice, Two or three or four; but if ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly (with them), then
only one, or (a captive) that your right hands possess, that will be more suitable, to prevent you from doing
injustice.” (The Holy Qur-an, Text, Translation and Commentary. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Arabia)
15
Mahr is a reverse dowry paid by the groom to the bride used for her maintenance in the event of divorce.
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say, God will not care about it. You need to do things God's way…. I am trying to teach
people what is right and good, based on what is in the Qur’an.
Thus, otinchalar’s religious knowledge helped them and their students evaluate and
when necessary challenge Islamic orthodoxy16 produced by other religious leaders,
identified by otinchalar as male. These women generated their own discourses about
being “right and good” Muslims.
These differing discourses on how to feel and act Muslim were contested among
otinchalar and between themselves and other formal religious leaders. The latter
criticized otinchalar’s educational and religious practices as wasteful and un-Islamic,
while the secular Uzbek state saw these as subversive activities that could potentially
foster religious and political opposition (cf. Fathi, 2006:309-312; Kandiyoti & Azimova,
2004:342-343). There were other formal religious leaders, however, who consulted with
some local otinchalar on matters of Islamic knowledge (cf. Imamkhodjaeva, 2005:336).
Feruza-opa reported that “the most important imam” in one city in the Valley called on
her several times for advice on religious matters. Many local men also sought blessings
and advice from an otincha.
Otinchalar also provided local women with places for religious observance inside the
women’s homes and at sacred sites. Some hadith literature,17 spatial restrictions, or
customary practices are used to discourage women from attending mosques. Muslim
women have varied responses to defining the mosque as a male space. Some of them
struggle to carve their place in the mosque (Egypt see Mahmood, 2005), choose not to
attend the mosque (Iran see Friedl, 2000:159), have their own mosques (China see
Gillette, 2000; Jaschok & Jingjun, 2000), or use local shrines (Bosnia, Uzbekistan, Iran
see Bringa, 1995; Friedl, 2000; Gorshunova, 2000). In the Ferghana Valley some
customary practices referred to locally as “our tradition” and spatial limitations (such as a
lack of women’s space at the local mosques) stifled women’s attendance and prayers at
mosques (although I was told that in the capital Tashkent, a very small number of women
did attend mosques).18 In this context, local women developed their own vital religious
activities, which often were home-centered, excluded men, and were officiated by
otinchalar, who sacralized women’s domestic space and made it suitable for
congregational prayer and ceremonial activities by reciting the Qur’an.

16

Asad (1986) defines Islam as a discursive tradition. The adherents of this tradition are actively engaged
in production of orthodoxy—“the establishment of a dominant version of religious tradition in specific
historical conjunctions through a discursive process that extends in time and space” (Makris, 2007: 38).
17
For example, “Do not forbid women from going to mosques, (but) their houses (buyut) [sic] are better for
them” (Abu Dawud, Sulayman b. Al-Ash’ath, 1935, Sunan, 4 vols. Cairo: Dar al-Fikr). In the process of
production of orthodoxy, however, a range of opinions addressed gendering of space. Some interpreted
sacred sources (the Qur’an and the hadith literature) as neither precluding nor fostering women’s
participation in the mosque’s activities. Others insist that a house, not the mosque, is the most appropriate
place for women’s religious observances. [Here I am referring to the Sunni positions, as many devout and
born-again Muslims claimed to follow the Hanafi mashab (Ar. madhab) one of the schools of jurisprudence
in Sunni Islam.] These differing positions are historically contingent and are inhabited variously by devout
individuals.
18
Imamkhodjaeva (2005) refers to this prohibition in the past tense. My feeling is that her data is gathered
in the capital and also at the time when the regime was toying with the idea of “safe” Islam (1991-1995).
Fathi (2006) mentions women’s attendance of the mosques without specifying where. During my research
in the Valley this prohibition, both overt and covert, was still in action.
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These otinchalar also delivered messages that addressed the community’s moral
standards and individuals’ ethical behavior. In this sense, the mosque came to the
women’s homes instead of them going to the mosques. Although during interviews some
local women expressed a desire to attend mosques, many were completely disinterested:
“The Qur’an says that one needs to pray socially within a group and we do just that at our
meetings and the information discussed in the mosques we receive from our husbands”
(interview 2002).
As part of religious ceremonies, otinchalar taught and preached about religious
renewal through didactic storytelling. These stories were based on the Qur’an, ahadith
and other sources and produced by otinchalar in response to the local people’s everyday
concerns. In the first decade of the 21st century many local women and men suffered
great economic hardships as a result of growing state authoritarianism and crumbling
local economies and industries. On one occasion Feruza-opa’s message focused on a
moral obligation of individuals to share their resources and called on the individuals to
change their socioeconomic situation: In Islam it is a good thing to help others, either
with money, a good deed, or a kind word…. The more you give, the more you get. Even
if you give spiritual goods such as a kind word or a prayer, you might get material goods
as a reward from God. If you will give material you might get spiritual rewards, such as
peace and love. If God gave you money but did not give you imon [dignity], God will not
multiply your wealth. If you do not have imon you will lose your material goods. There
are some poor people, who… are lazy and are envious of those who do have money. This
is not good either. The envy should stimulate people and not destroy them. God wants
you to share and work towards changing your economic condition…. If you are jealous
of those who make money, try to use this jealousy to make more money than they do, and
share it with others (participant-observation 2002).
This message targeted the moral side of economic inequality by focusing on and
fostering individual desire to share, yet equally emphasizing individual moral
responsibility in the process of on-going socioeconomic transformation in the Valley.
As reservoirs of religious knowledge, otinchalar are often asked for advice on social
and familial matters. On one occasion in the spring of 2003, some local women asked an
otincha if physically punishing minors was an Islamic practice. She responded that
[i]f a child offended you, do not strike your child. The child is not guilty. It is you
who is guilty. You did something wrong… did not pray, or have neglected some
of your religious duties…. Instead you should thank God for reminding you about
your duties through your children. Do not offend God, so that you can give a
proper example to your children of how to live their lives Islamically and not to
offend you. Change your behavior if you want to change your children’s.
Hence, according to this otincha, physical punishment was un-Islamic. It was individual
moral transformation that served as a prerequisite to a moral change within one family
and society.
Leading toward what?
Muslim women leaders in the Ferghana Valley actively participate in regional
social change. They think of social change as a moral renewal, a purification of existing
Islamic practices, and seem to have an implicit methodology for this renewal. Societal
moral renewal starts with a moral regeneration in otinchalar’s lives, their families’ lives,
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and then their students’ lives. Once they achieve a level of moral transformation,
otinchalar begin leading local Muslims (women, children, and men) away from certain
practices defined by them as un-Islamic and foreign; as Feruza-opa stated at a meeting in
2002, “[t]here are many practices that have nothing to do with Islam. Our people are
ovam hulq [uneducated people], who are mistaken in their practices. Otinchalar have to
correct them… we have to educate each other and the ovam hulq slowly.”
This leadership continues toward what I, following Asad (2003) and Marranci
(2008), call otinchalar’s highly variegated discursive Islamic orthodoxy about how to
feel and act as Muslims. They disagreed on various matters such as shrine worship and
attendance of sacred places (whether these practices were Islamic), on how to conduct
burial rites, number of spouses (wives), marriage ceremonies, and what was an
appropriate form of covered (Islamic) dress. Although at the time of the research there
were some disagreements among otinchalar on how to be “right and good” Muslims,
these women saw not a revolution but a moral evolution as the primary paradigm for
legitimate social change in the Valley. There was a very clear sense of the temporal
extension of this process in Fatima-hon’s description of her leadership: I criticize
people’s actions and I know that it is hard for people to hear criticism…. I ask for their
forgiveness and continue to criticize…. I ask my audience to think about what I said.
“Maybe later, maybe tomorrow”… I am sure it comes back to them… [W]e, otinchalar,
have to help people with these changes…. If we were good, our rulers would be good.
Everything starts with a person and with the family… One needs to work on her
goodness… We need to change ourselves first (interview 2003).
These otinchalar realized and upheld the importance of individual desire to change and
saw themselves as facilitators (or helpers) in cultivating this desire by providing some of
the necessary tools, such as their knowledge of religious sources. In Feruza-opa’s words,
“[t]hose who read [the Qur’an] will change themselves.” Hence, the genuine change had
to come from an individual capable of reading and understanding these sources, not
otinchalar, and not the state.
These women claimed to not believe in political engagement with the state.
According to them, an Islamist political party could not bring a meaningful social change,
Feruza-opa saw political activism of a local branch of Hizb-ut-Tahrir (The Party of
Liberation) as “a waste of time” and “an aggravation.” Rather, otinchalar were engaged
in a very different, according to them apolitical and yet, similar to the mosque movement
in Egypt, very political project— a project of moral transformation from within an
individual and local communities (Mahmood, 2005:34-35). Their politics exemplified
what Mahmood (2005:192) refered to as “politics in unusual places.” By constituting
informal networks rather than formal organizations, otinchalar were more productive in
constructing and transmitting Islamic knowledge and helping to forge a common,
however contested, moral identity as “right and good” Muslims among some members of
their communities. Less vulnerable to the state and formal religious authorities’ control,
they became important nodes connecting local women in their pursuit of moral
transformation. These expanded networks were more sustainable and effective than the
occasional political demonstrations that took place in the region and which were easily
put down by the state.19
19

As reported by Human Rights Watch (2005), one of these protests in 2005 culminated in the massacre of
civilians by government forces in the Valley’s city of Andijan (Andijon) (Khalid, 2007:192-198).
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These otinchalar acted as leaders among other women and within their local
communities without necessarily being recognized as such by formal religious and
secular authorities. They did not accept the formal religious leadership’s understanding
and interpretation of Islamic principals as normative, but inhabited this normative
discourse and actively participated in the production of their variegated orthodoxy as
ways of being “right and good” Muslims. By teaching religious classes in their homes,
conducting ritual ceremonies at local women’s homes, and by providing advice on social
and individual matters, these otinchalar introduced incremental social changes, both as
intended and “unintended outcome[s] of social reproduction…” (Giddens, 1984:220). In
other words, as leaders they cultivated a gradual moral renewal in their lives and their
communities.
Although these women were not referred to locally as clerics, imams or mullahs,
nor did they self-identify as such, they performed functions, as discussed above, among
local women similar to those performed by imams and mullahs among the men. They
were also recognized by the local communities as legitimate reservoirs of religious
knowledge and practice; they were “people’s professor[s]” and “taught Islam,” as the
opening paragraph demonstrates. But did they desire to hold the same leadership
positions as did the men?
Whose leadership? What leadership?
In an ongoing debate among Muslims about women’s leadership, which is
connected to the question of gender equality, the Qur’an and hadith literature are used to
justify different and often opposite positions. For the purposes of this article I sort these
positions into three categories: conservative, Islamic feminist, and no-uniformity. These
different positions all share an assumption that women desire the same forms of
leadership as the men hold. Further, in making a distinction between religious (spiritual)
and political leadership these positions reflect an assumption that political leadership is
limited to the realm of “politics as usual” such as participation in political parties,
judiciary system, and/or electoral office, or acting as formal religious leaders at the
mosques; in short to one’s public engagement with the state.
A radical conservative view considers women’s leadership (both religious and
political) to be un-Islamic and a result of Westernization and moral corruption. A less
dramatic conservative view allows for religious leadership among women but prohibits
all forms of political leadership. One of the most interrogated verses in regards to
women’s leadership is Qur’an 4:34.20 This verse and a famous hadith reported by Abu
Bakra21 serve a backbone for a conservative position on religious leadership, whose
proponents, as Abugideiri (2001) argues, have a gendered understanding of the word
20

English interpretations of the verse are often gendered and reductive. These interpretations are contested.
According to Yusuf Ali’s (1938) English interpretation a relevant part of this verse reads as follows: “Men
are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more (strength) than the
other, and because they support them from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly
obedient, and guard in (the husband's) absence what Allah would have them guard…” (The Holy Qur-an,
Text, Translation and Commentary. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Arabia). For a different interpretation of this
(and other) verse(s) see Laleh Bakhtiyar (2007) The Sublime Qur’an. Kazi Publications.
21
Imam Bukhari reports from Abu Bakra “… When news reached the Prophet that the Persians had
appointed Chosroe's daughter as their ruler, he said: ‘A nation which placed its affairs in the hands of a
woman shall never prosper!’” (Volume 5, Book 59, Number 709).

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 11 #1 November 2009

Published by Virtual Commons - Bridgewater State University, 2009

17

13

Journal of International Women's Studies, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 2

“leadership,” which “comes to represent the invisible construct, certainly assumed to be
masculine, to which the qualifier ‘female’ must be added in order to shift the focus from
larger issues of Islam to issues exclusive to women” (2001:89-91). Unquestionably
accepting this gendering of leadership relegates Muslim women “to the role of subject,
but without agency” (ibid.). One of the prominent representatives of the conservative
position, the famous theologian Syed Abul A'ala Maududi (d. 1979), interpreted this
Qur’anic verse to mean that if “[m]en are the managers of the affairs of women because
Allah has made the one superior to the other and because men spend of their wealth on
women,” then women cannot be leaders over or for men (Shehab, 1986:117).
The supporters of an Islamic feminist view of leadership provide different
articulations of leadership among Muslims through alternative readings and reinterpretations of the same (and other) religious and historical sources (for a discussion of
Islamic Feminism see Badran, 2002, 2009). Some representatives of Islamic feminism
argue that this hadith by Abu Bakra is not authentic (e.g. Mernissi, 1996). Other scholars
interpret the same Qur’anic verse to mean that men are “those who provide a means of
support or livelihood,” which does not mean that women cannot or should not provide for
themselves, but simply that in view of the heavy burden that most women shoulder in
childbearing and rearing, they should not have the additional obligation of providing the
means of living at the same time (Hassan, 1999: 264).
Amina Wadud, an American Islamic feminist and scholar, challenged the conservative
view of women’s leadership theologically in her writings and interviews and physically
by leading a mixed-gender Friday prayer in New York City in 2005 both as “a leader and
a woman” (Wadud, 1999; 2007:183).
A no-uniformity view suggests that there is no uniform position on the matter of
women’s leadership. Recognizing a de-centered nature in religious knowledge
production, this view’s proponents suggest that the very nature of Islam should result in
multiple positions on this issue. Muslim theologian Abu Hanifa suggested that women
could hold public office and act as judges “except in the case of criminal law (hudud)”
(Hasyim, 2006:143). Ibn Jarir “allowed women absolute rights to be leaders,” while Ibn
Hazm argued that women could have every position but not a head of the state (Hasyim,
2006:143,139). Other scholars pointed out the historical context of Abu Bakra’s hadith as
a response to particular developments in Persia at the time and argue that the hadith
cannot be read and applied literally to the contemporary issues in Muslim communities
(Izzat, 1997). Shaykh al-Qaradawi, a current religious leader with a strong physical and
virtual presence in various Muslim communities, granted Muslim women the right to
hold political office, as a way of furthering the cause of Islam (Stowasser, 2001:110-114).
Whose leadership is it anyway?
The most obvious contribution of my research to this debate about Muslim
women leaders is that it continues to problematize conservative views of women’s
leadership by providing numerous examples of it. This research also continues to
challenge the assumption that political leadership is limited to formal, public arena such
as the mosque (a male space), and/or to one’s engagement with the state. Operating under
this assumption makes it easy to overlook women’s religious and political leadership
taking place in unusual places, including public places created in the private domains of
individual Muslims’ homes and at sacred sites. By abandoning this assumption we can
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clearly see the existence of other leadership models operating in and engendered by the
particular socio-historical contexts of their respective societies. Otinchalar in the Valley
claim not to engage with the state; rather they retreat from the state into a public domain
of private space.
Further, by focusing on politics in unusual places, it becomes difficult to establish
and sustain a critical distinction between religious (spiritual) and political leadership. In
the case of otinchalar, their religious (spiritual) leadership is at the same time political
leadership that emerges from a systematic attempt to remake themselves and their
communities through religious education, observance, and advice based on the ethical
message of Islam as understood by these women. Otinchalar’s politics are not centered
on political engagement with the state, but on one’s moral being by teaching others how
to “not do and do not allow others to do gnoh [bad deeds],” by telling “people about
Islam,” by sharing knowledge, and educating “each other and ovam hulq [uneducated
people] slowly” (interview, Feruza-opa, 2002).
My research also demonstrates that formal and informal distinctions regarding
religious leadership reflect historically contentious relationships between the state and
Islam and are based in contextually particular constructions of gender. These distinctions
between formal and informal do not reflect a natural condition of men to be leaders in the
public arena and women to be their followers or lead in the private one. In a sense
otinchalar are formal leaders as well, as some local women in the Valley perceive their
meetings at homes to be as formal as those at mosques.
Further, I have exemplified how the current demarcation between formal and
informal in regard to leadership is porous. A merge of these domains takes place (1)
within family circles where husbands share information with their wives about the
meetings at the mosques and wives share with their husbands their Islamic knowledge,
and (2) among some formal and informal religious leaders, where male leaders consult
with female leaders on religious and social matters. Otinchalar’s leadership does extend
to local men through their advice on socio-religious matters and through intra-family
communications. Hence, in order to fully comprehend the importance of Muslim
women’s leadership in its different forms, we must critically interrogate the very
definition of leadership: does to lead others necessarily mean to physically preside over
them? In the case of otinchalar, their leadership is not over local women and men (nor do
they aspire to have such leadership positions). Rather it is a leadership by sharing
knowledge in particular ways engendered by their socio-historical context.
My research also questions the assumption common to the debate about women’s
leadership that women desire exactly the same leadership positions possessed by men.
One’s desire for particular forms of leadership is formed through a human interaction
with social and physical environments and is historically situated. Some North American
Muslim women leaders like Amina Wadud have served as leaders in mixed-gender
communal prayers and were both praised and condemned by Muslims and non-Muslims.
In a North American context, the history of women’s suffrage and the civil rights
movement has engendered such desires; many American women fought for a long time to
be able to occupy male-dominated positions of leadership and authority. Yet, why should
we assume exactly the same desires on the part of women worldwide, or even on the part
of all women in North America?22 While some desired and fought for their right to work,
22

For a discussion of other forms of leadership see Mattson (2005).
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others, particularly poor underprivileged women, like some Muslim women in southern
California, desired a right to not work, not to be like men (see Rouse, 2004).
Leading men in congregational prayer at the mosque is only one definition of
leadership. There are other forms of leadership, such as otinchalar’s, that do not seek
formal political authority and leadership and do not pursue or advocate radical social
restructuring. Rather they produce socio-political criticism and leadership in a selfreflexive manner at a local level, where one has to change oneself and then a collectivity
of these morally transformed individuals will eventually constitute a morally sound
Islamic community and perhaps even a polity.
Finally, I argue that Muslim women’s leadership has to be considered in light of
the contested models of gender differences within their local communities. These
differences are not intrinsic, but are socially produced, historically engendered, dynamic,
and inform not only the division of labor in a society, but also result in often contrasting
possibilities of expression for men and women. Thus, leadership is enacted and
experienced differently by and among men and women. In the Valley desire for the
positions of authority and leadership in the formal public domain are often perceived as
men’s desires. Local women often desire different forms of socio-religious
accomplishments through an ongoing cultivation of individual and social moral renewal
in other spaces and places. They, too, lead. Their leadership, however, takes on different
forms, equally important, but not exactly the same as those of imams and mullahs at local
mosques and within local communities. We may read these forms of leadership as what I.
M. Lewis (1986) called the “dual spiritual economy” in Islam with the two branches,
male and female, being “interdependent and complementary” (1986:106). Yet, this dual
spiritual economy, as I have demonstrated, is historically constituted and is not absolute.
A careful contextual and historical consideration of gender dynamics in a community in
question may provide a more fruitful venue for a debate about Muslim women’s
leadership.
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